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According to John Rawls’s difference principle, if we have a choice between economic 
system A and economic system B and the worst-off group in system A would be better off than 
the worst-off group in system B, then we should prefer to implement A over B, as long as certain 
basic rights are secured.1 Such a system is more just, says Rawls. Here we can understand “just” 
as another word for fair.2 Rawls thinks that the value of being in a more just society should not 
be compromised for realizing any other value.3 But this leads to a worry. 
 Let us suppose that being better off under a given economic system is a matter of having 
more wealth. This is a simplification of Rawls’s thinking, but is harmless here.4 Let us also 
suppose the following. We live in a society with one particular economic system and there is an 
alternative system available to us. This alternative system would leave the worst-off group with 
more wealth, but the increase would be miniscule. In this case, it seems acceptable to prefer the 
                                                          
1 Rawls 1999: 68. 
2 For an analysis of the relationship between these terms in Rawls, see Steiner 2018: 378. 
3 Rawls 1999: 304. 
4 Rawls tells us that the difference principle concerns income and wealth, not just wealth (1999: 53). Max Seeger 
understands the difference principle to not just be concerned with material goods but also with self-respect (2011). 
2 
 
current system or to be indifferent between the two. And yet Rawls’s difference principle tells us 
that we should prefer the alternative system and that if we do not prefer it, we are unjust. 
Rawls discusses a kind of case involving the option of tiny improvements and tells us that 
it is unrealistic.5 I do not think he can say this for the kind of case I have described. The 
difference principle applies to any government economic decision,6 and not just to grand 
questions such as whether to have a capitalist or communist economic system. Many such 
decisions can themselves be described as decisions between two systems: two sets of economic 
rules. Here then is a hypothetical example which may soon be relevant: the government of the 
UK introduces its own cryptocurrency, called the cryptopound. At the time when it is introduced, 
a single cryptopound is worth the same as one ordinary pound, but unlike the ordinary pound it 
can be divided extremely finely. The government gives some cryptopound to the worst-off group 
when introducing the currency and plans to do so again each year. A certain alternative system 
which relies on a different cryptocurrency, one with slightly faster transaction speeds, would be 
slightly better for the economy as a whole, but the gain for the worst-off group would be 
miniscule. For example, the gain when the next payment occurs is equivalent to 0.00000001 
cryptopound. 
 One thing that Rawlsians might say is that there needs to be a significant gap between the 
wealth levels of the worst-off groups in the current economic system and the alternative, or else 
it is not the case that we should prefer the alternative. It is acceptable to prefer the current system 
or be indifferent between the two. If they say this, I take them to be modifying the difference 
principle. Now it is only the case that one should prefer economic system A over economic 
system B if certain basic rights are secured and if the worst-off group would be significantly 
                                                          
5 Rawls 1999: 136. See also Copp 1974: 234-236; Mackenzie 1977: 383. 
6 It seems more faithful to Rawls’s text to say, “any government decision which concerns the basic structure of 
society” (1999: 3), but I cannot see that this qualification makes a difference below. 
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better off in A. However, this modification gives rise to a paradox.7 More precisely, it gives rise 
to a paradox if we grant the following transitivity claim: if it is acceptable to be indifferent 
between economic systems A and B, and it is also acceptable to be indifferent between economic 
systems B and C, then it is acceptable to be indifferent between A and C. 
Let us consider nine economic systems and label them 1 to 9.  Let us suppose that there is 
a significant gap between the worst-off positions in 1 and in 9 (even if we are unsure where 
exactly the boundary between significant and insignificant lies). The worst-off group in 9 is 
significantly wealthier. But between 1 and 2 there is no significant gap, nor between 2 and 3, nor 
between 3 and 4, and so on. The small gaps build up so that there is a significant gap between 1 
and 9. Owing to the small gaps, it is acceptable to be indifferent between 1 and 2, and it is 
acceptable to be indifferent between 2 and 3. By transitivity, it is therefore acceptable to be 
indifferent between 1 and 3. It is acceptable to be indifferent between 3 and 4. So, given that it is 
acceptable to be indifferent between 1 and 3, by transitivity it is also acceptable to be indifferent 
between 1 and 4. By continuing on this path, we can argue that it is acceptable to be indifferent 
between 1 and 9, which contradicts the modified difference principle. 
 I find it natural to describe this as an instance of a familiar type of paradox, namely a 
Sorites paradox; but perhaps there is some reason to reserve the term “a Sorites paradox” for 
paradoxes that are about vague terms.8 In any case, what are the options for defending the 
difference principle? I shall only present some obvious options below, because the other options 
that occurred to me do not raise distinct issues. 
One option is to give up on the transitivity claim presented above. But Rawls commits 
himself to this claim when specifying what it is for individuals who are deciding on rules for 
                                                          
7 See Luce 1956: 179. 
8 The paradox I have presented would arise even if “significant” were not vague. 
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society to be rational.9 
A second option is to reject the modified difference principle and simply insist on the 
unmodified difference principle. But the unmodified principle seems too demanding. It requires 
us to change the economic system to improve the wealth level of the worst-off group, even if the 
consequent improvement is fractional.10 The government will presumably pay some people to 
implement a new system. Nevertheless, if a politician were to bizarrely propose, “Let us change 
to this new system, because of the 0.00000001% gain for the worst off,” it is a petty political 
morality which entails that it is unjust and immoral not to. For it is quite reasonable to say, “Shall 
we wait until a system with a more significant improvement comes along?” 
A third option is to deny my starting point: that there could be a society which has one 
particular economic system when there is an alternative that is better for the worst-off, but this 
alternative is only fractionally better and would take much effort to implement. After all, it is this 
starting point which leads to a modification of the difference principle, which leads to a Sorites 
paradox. At present I cannot see any grounds for pursuing this third option. Given what we know 
at the moment, the cryptocurrency example I gave earlier is plausible. 
It is well-known that the pioneers of cryptocurrency are libertarians who do not think that 
governments should control money supply. Beyond their specific libertarianism, it seems that 
there is a “metaphysical incompatibility” between Rawlsian liberalism and cryptocurrencies in 
general. The very nature of this phenomenon gives rise to possibilities that the Rawlsian system 
has no suitable way of dealing with. 
                                                          
9 Rawls 1999: 123-124. 
10 Perhaps someone will try to defend the unmodified difference principle by saying, “If the improvement in what 
the worst-off group gets is very small, then we will not be able to tell beforehand that the alternative system would 
be an improvement. We know that we should implement the system which is better for the worst-off group, but we 
do not know which system this is.” But why think the principle itself is true if the improvement is tiny? In any case, 
perhaps we can be reasonably confident that a change would make a slight difference. We can model two economic 
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